When an AI agent makes a promise, what's your record?

The platform or customer system supplies the record as hashes and metadata. Lumra never receives the audio or the transcript.

• Transcript SHA-256 and audio SHA-256, sealed into the signed record
• Call duration, platform, and call identifiers
• The moment the record was sealed, and by which key
• AI participation and disclosure flags, as asserted by the source
• Signing status: cloud-signed by Lumra at intake, or source-signed by the platform and verified when provided
• An Evidence Trust Assessment: enumerated, versioned checks on source signature, timing, and policy, recorded as facts rather than a score, and sealed inside the pack
• Two RFC-3161 timestamps from unrelated authorities over the record's fingerprint, the second sealed inside the pack
• Exported as a ProofPack anyone can verify offline, no PriviNet servers involved

Because in a dispute, your logs and your audio are your evidence, and the other side's first move is to ask whether any of it could have been cleaned up after the fact. That one question can cost months of discovery. A ProofPack answers it directly instead of arguing it: the record was sealed before anyone knew it would matter, and opposing counsel or the arbitrator verifies it themselves, offline, with a free tool that never contacts PriviNet or you.

For a voice platform, the same pack is the clean answer to finger-pointing. It is verifiable proof of exactly what your API delivered, sealed with a timestamp sought the moment it arrived. If a client's CRM shows something different, the pack narrows the dispute to their sync, not your infrastructure.

In a real dispute, nobody attacks SHA-256. A challenger argues the record was wrong before it was sealed: the platform produced a flawed transcript, or dropped audio at the moment of intake. Sealing what arrives answers tampering. It does not answer origin.

That is why the seal should live as close to the source as possible. When the platform signs the record at origin, the custody question disappears. What is left, whether the platform's own capture was accurate, is now a question about their signed record, not a claim we are making. The dispute gets smaller and better defined, not resolved. That is the version described at the bottom of this page, and the reason to build it with us.

Below is a real sample pack generated by the live engine from a synthetic conversation. Open it, or download the machine JSON, change a single character of the transcript hash, and run the standalone verifier. Verification fails. Change it back, it passes. That is the whole product.

Object Lock and similar WORM storage do one thing well: nothing in the bucket changes during the lock. That is storage immutability inside a closed loop you administer. No signature says who created the record or when. No independent timestamp fixes it in time. And the other side can only check it by being handed access to your cloud account.

A ProofPack adds the signature, two third-party timestamps from unrelated authorities, and offline verification with no access to your systems. The two compose: our own evidence archive is retention-locked WORM storage, and a pack stays just as verifiable archived in your own locked bucket.