Engineering Note · Reproducible Black-Box Model
Why single-vendor custody engines grade their own homework.
When an approval web screen, policy engine, and signing key live inside one vendor boundary, or when humans approve transactions they cannot decode at the byte level, one compromised UI or session can authorize a catastrophic transfer. Below are the four public black-box boundary invariants of Decern, paired with two standalone models your security team or reviewers can run in five seconds.
Architectural Gap
Three structural failure modes in institutional signing today.
Across corporate crypto treasuries, tokenized RWA minting contracts, and autonomous AI agent wallets, high-severity losses share one root cause: the caller and the policy check share a trust boundary.
1. Screen-to-Byte Divergence (The Bybit Failure Class): In February 2025, three hardware-wallet signers at Bybit approved what their browser displayed as a routine transfer while disguised raw parameters executed an ownership takeover costing roughly $1.5 billion. Hardware multisig thresholds worked as coded; the failure occurred because no independent machine boundary unpacked the raw unsigned bytes outside the compromised UI.
2. Single-Domain Policy & Audit Logs: Institutional MPC platforms protect private key shares well, yet their web console, API policy engine, and audit log reside inside one vendor trust domain. External financial statement reviewers, Proof-of-Reserve CPAs, and public-company Audit Committees are left trusting internal vendor exports rather than cross-domain separation of duties.
3. Caller-Side SDK Rules & Concurrent Races: As documented in the October 2026 V12 x402 review (25 flaws) and Cloud Security Alliance note, placing spend caps inside an agent's own SDK fails when prompts are hijacked or parallel sub-agents race the same allowance before state settles.
Four Public Boundary Invariants
What the reference model checks across all 864 states.
Every combination of three asset rails, four wire mutations, four approval quorum counts, three nonce/TTL freshness states, three intent-digest bindings, and direct-bypass attempts is evaluated deterministically.
| Invariant | Black-Box Boundary Rule | Attack Classes Halted | Model Result |
|---|---|---|---|
INV-1Zero Caller Keys |
Calling UIs, treasury scripts, and AI agents hold zero vault keys and cannot emit a co-signature without passing the external Decern gate. | Prompt injection, stolen API bearer tokens, compromised frontend servers. | 864 / 864 PASS |
INV-2Raw-Byte Binding |
Destination, integer amount, and contract operation flag reconstructed from raw unsigned bytes must equal the approved intent digest within policy caps. | Bybit-style disguised delegatecall, recipient address swaps, 10x over-cap mint() calls. |
0 False Allows |
INV-3Quorum & Nonce |
Requires at least 2-of-3 valid NIST FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65 approvals bound to an unspent single-use nonce and active expiration window. |
Single-insider bypass (1-of-3), concurrent retry races, replayed spent approvals. | $0.00 Overdraft |
INV-4Offline Receipt |
Every allow or refusal seals canonical digests into a standalone receipt anchored to dual RFC 3161 Timestamp Authorities (freetsa.org, ts.ssl.com). |
Post-incident log editing (+1 unit mutation detected offline with zero calls to PriviNet). | 864 / 864 Caught |
Verify in 10 Seconds
Don't take a slide deck on faith. Run the model.
Requires only standard Python 3.9+ (zero third-party pip packages). For symbolic Dolev-Yao trace analysis, run the companion .pv file in INRIA ProVerif.
# 1. Download the standalone 864-state Python boundary checker & run it curl -sLO https://privinet.net/verify_decern_boundary.py python3 verify_decern_boundary.py DECERN BLACK-BOX BOUNDARY MODEL CHECKER v1.0.0 Exhaustive Cartesian states evaluated : 864 Authorized states (valid 2-of-3/3-of-3): 6 Refused attack/mismatch/replay states : 858 Unauthorized co-signatures emitted : 0 Offline +1 tamper mutations caught : 864/864 RESULT: ALL 4 PUBLIC BLACK-BOX BOUNDARY INVARIANTS VERIFIED (EXIT 0). # 2. Optional: verify symbolic Dolev-Yao injective agreement in ProVerif curl -sLO https://privinet.net/decern_boundary.pv proverif decern_boundary.pv
1. Exhaustive State Checker (.py)
Zero-dependency Python 3.9+ reference checker testing all 864 boundary combinations and offline receipt mutations.
2. Symbolic Protocol Model (.pv)
INRIA ProVerif specification modeling an untrusted UI/agent on public channel c against 2-of-3 quorum signing.
Stage 0 is $0 (10-day guided setup on Ethereum Sepolia or Bitcoin signet, zero custody).